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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

ZACHARY TYLER ALLEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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)
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NO. 47093-2019
BONNEVILLE COUNTY NO. CRl0-18-12236

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Allen pleaded guilty to one count of forgery. The
district court imposed a sentence of five years, with one and one-half years fixed, but retained
jurisdiction. On appeal, Mr. Allen asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessively harsh underlying sentence.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In December of 2018, an Idaho Falls Police officer spoke with the owner of Advantage
Employer Solutions, which contracted with Dairy Queen to handle their payroll. (Presentence
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Report (PSI), pp.2-3.) 1 The owner told the officer that his company had issued one check to
Mr. Allen for $14.84.

(PSI, p.3.)

Pursuant to an investigation, the officer discovered that

Mr. Allen had cashed that check for an altered amount, and had forged and cashed-or attempted
to cash-several other checks in other towns in eastern Idaho. (PSI, p.3.)
The following day, the officer was advised that Mr. Allen was trying to cash another
check. (PSI, p.3.) When the officer responded to the bank, he saw Mr. Allen trying to cash the
check, and Mr. Allen later admitted that he had previously cashed forged checks and received
$2,316.52 from those transactions. (PSI, p.3.)
After waiving a preliminary hearing, Mr. Allen was charged, by Information, with one
count of grand theft, and one count of forgery. (R., pp.27-31.)2 Subsequently, he agreed to plead
guilty to the forgery charge. (R., pp.35-37.) In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the grand
theft charge, concur with the PSI' s sentencing recommendation, and recommend "no worse than
a retained jurisdiction." (R., pp.35-37; Tr., p.8, L.3 -p.10, L.5.) 3
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Allen's counsel requested that the district court impose a
sentence of three years, with one year fixed, but suspend that sentence and place Mr. Allen on
probation.

(Tr., p.19, Ls.4-6.)

The State recommended that the district court impose an

underlying sentence of eight years, with two years fixed, and retain jurisdiction. (Tr., p.19,
Ls.13-16.)

Ultimately, the district court retained jurisdiction, and imposed an underlying

sentence of five years, with one and one-half years fixed. (R., pp.57-59; Tr., p.23, L.12 - p.24,
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All citations to the PSI refer to the 44-page electronic document.
The Clerk's Record in this case is split into three separate volumes. However, the pagination is
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Volume 1; pages 65-96 are contained in Volume 2_Part 1; and pages 97-126 are contained in
Volume 2 Part 2.
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L. 1.) Mr. Allen filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court's judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.68-70.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an underlying sentence of five years,
with one and one-half years fixed, following Mr. Allen's plea of guilty to one count of forgery?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Underlying Sentence Of Five
Years, With One And One-Half Years Fixed, Following Mr. Allen's Plea Of Guilty To One
Count Of Forgery
Given the facts of this case, Mr. Allen's underlying sentence of five years, with one and
one-half years fixed, is excessive because it is not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing.
When there is a claim that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, this Court will
conduct "an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense,
the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest." State v. McIntosh, 160
Idaho 1, 8 (2016). In such a review, the Court "considers the entire length of the sentence under
an abuse of discretion standard." Id. An appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry when an
exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal. It considers whether the trial court: "(1) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion;
(3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it;
and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho
856, 863 (2018).
"When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, 'the most fundamental
requirement is reasonableness."' McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8 (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho
606, 608 (1991)). Unless it appears that the length of the sentence is "necessary to accomplish
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the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution,” the sentence is unreasonable. Id. When a sentence is
excessive “considering any view of the facts,” because it is not necessary to achieve these goals,
it is unreasonable and therefore an abuse of discretion. Id.
There are multiple mitigating factors that show why Mr. Allen’s sentence is excessive
under any reasonable view of the facts.

First, Mr. Allen was only

when he

committed these offenses. (PSI, p.1.) Additionally, this was Mr. Allen’s first felony conviction.
(PSI, p.16.) These are both well-established mitigating factors that should be considered by the
trial court at sentencing. State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980); State v. Owen, 73 Idaho
394, 402 (1953) (“The courts have long recognized that the first offender should be accorded
more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal. In addition to considerations of humanity,
justice and mercy, the object is to encourage and foster the rehabilitation of one who has for the
first time fallen into error, and whose character for crime has not become fixed.”), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971)).
Mr. Allen acknowledged that he was first arrested when he was only

but

that appears to be tied to the fact that he was asked to leave his adoptive parents’ home at that
age. (PSI, pp.10-11.) Regarding his childhood, he stated that he was “bullied and threatened at
school,” and he felt as though his adoptive parents blamed him for “everything that went wrong
at home . . . .” (PSI, p.11.) And, after his parents told him to leave their home, he lived with
friends for some time, but ultimately ended up homeless.

(PSI, pp.11-12.)

His difficult

childhood should also be considered as mitigating information. See e.g., State v. Gonzales, 123
Idaho 92, 93-94 (Ct. App. 1993).
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Despite the fact that he has struggled to find his way as a young man, Mr. Allen still
aspires to better himself by getting an education and perhaps joining the military. (PSI, pp.12,
15.) At the sentencing hearing, he told the district court that he wanted to “go into the Marines
[and] go to law school.” (Tr., p.22, Ls.8-9.) He said he had already taken the Armed Service
Vocational Aptitude Battery, and he had passed it, with the exception of the mathematics section.
(Tr., p.22, Ls.9-10.) He reported that he suffered with a “math disability” and had trouble
understanding “mathematical concepts.” (PSI, p.12.) This is likely tied to the fact that he
struggles with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.

(PSI, pp.12, 14.)

In fact, the PSI

investigator recommended that Mr. Allen be tested for the disorder again, as it “may impact his
ability to hold a job.” (PSI, p.14.) A defendant’s mental health issues are also a long-recognized
mitigating factor. State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 391 (1994) (“Idaho Code § 19–2523, which
requires that the trial court consider the defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor, was an
integral part of the legislature’s repeal of mental condition as a defense.”).
Similarly, in fashioning an appropriate sentence, a trial court should consider a
defendant’s acceptance of responsibility and remorse over his actions. State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing the defendant’s sentence, in part, because “the defendant has
accepted responsibility for his acts”). State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that some leniency was required, in part, because the defendant expressed “remorse for
his conduct”). In this case, Mr. Allen accepted responsibility for what he had done from the
outset. He admitted to law enforcement that he had forged the checks, and he explained to the
PSI investigator that he forged the checks because he wanted to break out of the “same routine”
of being “homeless living in [his] car again.” (PSI, pp.3.) He also said, “I committed the alleged
to pay bills, get my own place, and not be trash.” (PSI, p.3.) He was also remorseful; he stated
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that he felt horrible about doing it and wanted to make it right. (PSI, p.3.) Additionally, in his
comments to the court, he wrote, "I feel really horrible about what I did .... " (PSI, p.15.)
Mr. Allen asserts that his underlying sentence is excessive because it is not necessary to
achieve the goals of sentencing, and the district court failed to adequately consider the wealth of
mitigating information in his case when it imposed that sentence. In light of that mitigating
information, and Mr. Allen's clear desire to improve himself, a shorter underlying sentence
would still serve as a significant deterrent. It would also achieve the goal of protecting society
while providing appropriate retribution. As such, Mr. Allen asserts that his extended underlying
sentence was not necessary and therefore unreasonable and an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Allen respectfully requests that this Court reduce his underlying sentence as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 17th day of December, 2019.

I sf Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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